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The  concept of human rights, supposedly of universal importance, is usually derived from 
the tradition referred to as ‘Western’. Although the ‘classic approaches’  –  Greek, Roman and 
Christian, refer to the norms of natural law, making them the basis or limits of the rights of 
individuals, in modern approaches the relation is reserved, in the manner that rights become 
primary to norms. Although liberals of the  17th and  18th centuries consider the law of nature as 
a tool for their protection, starting from the  19th century, the rights (already called human rights) 
have been increasingly perceived as positive abilities to articulate own, subjective preferences of 
individuals. This evolution needs to be accounted for in the studies carried out by representatives 
of various cultures, since the comprehension of an individual (and even a  ‘human person’ as 
in contemporary Catholic social teaching) as an essentially culturally unconditioned one, is its 
ineradicable element.
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1. GENERAL PROBLEMS
The  position of the Roman Catholic Church as a  community of believers, with priests 
serving in its hierarchical structure as guides to salvation, was shaped in late ancient 
and medieval monarchies and republics. The process was marked not only by dualistic 
and monistic doctrines, characteristic of the Latin and Greek world respectively, but also 
by the formula of Pope Gregory the Great who held his office at the turn of the  6th and 
 7th century. Based on St. Augustine’s philosophy, the formula assumed that rulers and 
their subjects would slowly but surely transform their conscience and eventually come 
to the path which leads to salvation. In what Augustine called the earthly cities, people’s 
intentions would be increasingly motivated not by the fear of punishment, but the promise 
of redemption, thus moving them toward the right end established by God’s sacrifice for 
the sake of mankind marked by the original sin. Gregory’s formula has not been forgotten 
today: the Church still hopes for people of different cultures to understand the message 
of the sacrifice, so beautifully expounded by St. Paul. Less and less, however, is being 
said about the natural law that is supposed to set the universal normative boundaries 
for human actions, perhaps established by God Himself and corresponding to the ideal 
of humanity conceived by Him before the act, or process of creation. The idea of fixed 
norms to be recognised by human reason, present in St. Thomas Aquinas, but also in 
John Paul II’s  1993 Encyclical Veritatis Splendor or even in the International Theological 
Commission’s  2009 document In Search of a Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural 
Law, is now being abandoned in favour of human rights founded on the innate dignity 
of every human person created by God. It is precisely this change, already mentioned by 
Pope Benedict XVI  in his famous  2011 Bundestag speech on the increasingly counter-
cultural nature of the Christian science of law, which is going to be the subject of my 
paper. I  will argue that this change is determined by the context of liberal democracy 
and might be seen as a reaction of the Catholic Church concerned about the condition of 
Western societies, where liberal justifications are being used to transgress the boundaries 
once set by the norms of natural law.
I  am not going to analyse the institutional shape of liberal democracy which is well-
known and does not need an in-depth commentary. Suffice it to say that this shape is 
determined by several basic principles; most importantly, by the legislative representation 
of the ‘collective sovereign’ and the separation of powers among a few branches, based on 
the idea of checks and balances. The mechanism founded by these principles refers to groups 
of diverse needs and preferences, made up by individuals who are subjects of human and 
civil rights granted to them by the constitution. Liberal-democratic constitutions speak 
little of obligations and if they do, the obligations are either interpersonal duties or duties 
to the state. Instead, what I am interested in here is the problem I  shall call normative: 
the confrontation of liberal-democratic and Catholic understandings of human and civil 
rights. I disagree both with Carl Schmitt who argued that modernity is founded on the 
‘optimistic vision of the man’ and with Martin Heidegger’s thesis (as quoted in Harry 
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follow the Jesuit Naphta from Thomas Mann’s The  Magic Mountain in arguing that its 
main problem is the foundation of it as a modern subject solely in relation to society, not 
to any metaphysically superior being. Consequently, the modern man is grounded only 
in ‘this world’ and is losing interest in the supernatural end. The  ideal of earthly self-
realisation is offered to modern man by liberal democracy which guarantees individuals 
a set of inviolable rights and liberties. The use of these rights is supposed to make them 
discover and reveal their unique selves, and their needs and preferences no longer related 
to the anticipation of salvation but rather to the comfortable coexistence with others. 
My ‘normative problem’ does not refer to the democratic moment of liberal democracies; 
I am not concerned with the disputes on the aggregative, deliberative or agonistic nature 
of democracy as they all share the individualistic perspective of the common. The problem 
I am concerned with seems to be deeper: no matter how the ‘democratic environment’ is 
conceptualised, we are already used to thinking of rights and liberties of the individual as 
the only legitimate point of departure since it is the individual who is essentially conceived 
of as the main actor of this environment.
Two remarks, however, need to be made about today’s liberal democracies. First, we 
shall not forget about the increasing tendency to expose the ‘cultural rights’ of not only 
individuals but also groups. These ‘cultural groups’ are no longer defined solely by religion 
(although the growing Muslim population in Western countries makes the issue up- to-
date) but also by, for example, gender identification. If the rights and liberties are attributed 
to both individuals and groups, the liberal component of democracies is bound to change 
dramatically. Consequently, the question will come up who is to be protected by the liberal-
democratic state: individuals of the groups they belong to or the groups which will be 
granted legal autonomy like medieval corporations. Second, the very nature of the liberal 
component might be problematic. Especially in the agonistic model, liberalism is said to 
restrict democracy which is the area of an inconclusive struggle to include those who had 
been excluded and, as such, it cannot respect any permanent, unquestionable points of 
reference like the catalogue of individual rights and liberties. That said, these problems are 
of no concern to us as we are moving in another direction: to grab the nature of some more 
permanent changes, initiated already in the early modern age and ongoing nowadays, with 
consequences more and more visible to us.
Let us start by saying that the classical approach, inspired mostly by Aristotle and the 
Stoics, and also used by Roman lawyers, recognised the primacy of the normative order 
not established by God, but the people. However, the order was not consensually agreed 
on but rather found in the ‘nature of things’ or long-term principles. The appeal to nature 
was at times (vide Aristotle) founded on the argument of ‘inborn inclinations’ common 
to all representatives of human kind. Once the inclinations to live, procreate, belong and 
learn the essence of things were found, they had to be protected by what was later on called 
the ‘norms of natural law’, not revealed by God but recognised by inborn, human reason. 
That way the normative context was also established for legislation: no matter who the law-
makers were, they were supposed to respect the boundaries set by these norms. As long as 
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violated and the law-maker was doing the right thing protecting the inborn inclinations 
of human kind. Human nature was to be realised both by the law-maker and individuals, 
supposed to follow the norms and thus live in accordance with their own inclinations. 
All in all, the construction was simple: legal order was good and individual actions were 
rightful only if and as long as they followed the superior natural law. That also means 
that legal and moral elements of the construction were identical as they both shared the 
common foundation of natural human inclinations.
2. AQUINAS’S IDEA OF LAW AND RIGHTS: LAW BEFORE RIGHTS
Things got complicated with the coming of the Christians, whose teachings were based not 
on Aristotle’s theses, but on the theses found in the Old Testament. Consequently, their 
‘superior law’ was not derived from the nature of things and personal inclinations but came 
from the outside, revealed by the commanding of God. In the late middle ages, Christian 
philosophers tried to reconcile the teachings of the Bible with classical thought, the project 
which culminated in St. Thomas Aquinas, whose theses were later adopted by many 
Aristotelians. As argued by Thomas (with clear references to Stoicism), divine law was not 
directly revealed to humans but rather naturally ‘inscribed’ in their ‘hearts’. Unlike the 
pre-Christian conceptions of natural law, however, the late medieval ones had to consider 
the distinction into legal and moral normative orders introduced by the dualistic doctrines 
of the early middle ages: while the legal order is compelling by nature, the function of the 
moral order is to guide humans toward salvation. When Aquinas is discussing man’s final 
end, he starts with the Aristotelian conception of ‘happiness’ and ends with the Christian 
doctrine of the beatific vision of God in heaven. When he is discussing virtues, he completes 
his treatment of them by talking about the ‘theological virtues’ of faith, hope and charity. 
But we also know that Aquinas believed in the harmonious relation between all truths, 
however attained, and he wished to exhibit and illustrate this harmony. First of all, he 
maintains that in every human act the will is directed towards an end, towards something 
apprehended as or thought to be good, that is, something which is known or thought to be 
perfect in some way as the subject who desires and chooses. And in accordance with his 
finalistic conception of nature, Aquinas goes on to argue that human will is necessarily 
set towards the final or ultimate good of man as such, and that it is under the impulse 
of this dynamic and innate will’s orientation that we make our particular choices, which 
are secondary to the main choice very much like all particular ends are secondary to the 
ultimate or final end. But it must be remembered that Aquinas presupposes the existence of 
God, who created things with innate tendencies towards the development of their own real 
potentialities. He presupposes that human nature has been created by a personal God who 
would have not created it with an unavoidable impulse towards a non-existent good or an 
unobtainable good and – as a consequence – that all human beings, like all created things, 
tend towards the actualisation of the potentialities of their natures, even though they may 
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but also by means of intellect and will. Natural intellect alone is capable to see the idea of 
human good. For Aquinas, grace does not annul but perfects human nature: revelation 
sheds further light, but it does not cancel the truths attainable by purely philosophical 
reflection.
Although the differences between Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s conceptions of man’s ultimate 
good may be great, it is clear that both men developed finalistic or teleological theories of 
ethics. For both, human acts derive their moral quality from their relation to man’s final 
end. According to Aquinas, every human act has two sides, interior and exterior, ‘formal’ 
and ‘material’; the absence of any of them, especially of the right intention which belongs 
to the interior act, is sufficient to prevent our calling it good in an unqualified manner. 
In order for a human act in the full sense to be morally good, it must be compatible both 
‘formally’ and ‘materially’ with the attainment of the final end. What is done, as well as 
the intention with which the act is performed and the way in which it is performed, must 
be compatible with the attainment of the final end. From this relation the act ultimately 
derives its moral quality.
In connection with Aquinas’s idea of the law, we may say that the natural reason of all men 
sees that some acts are necessary to obtain man’s good; for example, this natural reason 
sees that it is necessary to take reasonable means to preserve one’s life. Law in general, as 
he says, is a rule or measure of human acts, conceived by reason and promulgated with 
a view to the common good or an ordinance of reason made for the common good by 
him who has charge of the community, and promulgated,1 in virtue of which one is led to 
perform certain actions and restrained from the performance of others by reason as the 
first principle of human action, which directs action to its appropriate end. Authority of 
law is grounded on the will if it is regulated by ‘reason when it commands’; this does not 
mean that for Aquinas the law depends on God’s or a lawgiver’s arbitrary choice, as it does 
later, for example, for Scotists.2 He speaks of God as an artist who has an idea of the work to 
1 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae  1a  2ae,  90.4, ed. by Thomas Gilby (London,  1966).
2 The  famous members of the Franciscan order, not Dominican as Aquinas, Duns Scotus and William of 
Ockham, connected the law of nature or God with legal rights. For Scotus ius naturale was not simply neutral 
with regard to dominium, as was in Aquinas, but it positively ruled it out, since common use was the optimum 
strategy for men in a state of innocence. For him, common use was the common dominium. It was not the 
case that the human race collectively had the kind of right over the world, rather that each human being was 
simply able to take what he needed, and had no right to exclude others from what was necessary for them 
(Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories. Their Origin and Development [Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,  1979],  21–22). John Duns Scotus took dominium to be necessarily private, something which could not 
only be exchanged, but also defended against the claims of the needy, and quite possibly by violence. Man could 
have property, which was not purely a feature of a social life. In Ockham’s case, one may see identification of 
the right of use and the right of ownership and, as a consequence, identification of individual or subjective 
powers with rights, rights of God or humankind as well as rights of an individual person. In this conception 
there is no impersonal common good and public norms that may seem to have objective validity. There are 
public norms which are conventional constructions of these various subjects and which regulate only external 
relations between citizens. Hence political thought and action is totally concerned with the conflict, balancing 
and delegating various but always subjective powers-rights. The  right of use (ius utendi) was defined by 
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be created or done and of the means to its fulfilment. God conceives eternally all creatures 
according to their different kinds: He conceives their ends and the means to the attainment 
of these ends. Divine wisdom, considered as moving all things according to their several 
ends in subordination to the end of the whole created universe, the communication of 
the divine perfection, is the eternal law. Hence the eternal law is nothing else than the plan 
of the divine wisdom considered as directing all the acts and motions’ of creatures3 to the 
attainment of their ends. Man, as a rational and free being, is capable of acting in ways 
which are incompatible with this law and it is therefore essential that he should know the 
eternal law so far as it concerns himself. Although man cannot read off the eternal law 
in God’s mind, he can discern the fundamental tendencies and needs of his nature, and 
by reflecting on them he can come to a knowledge of the natural moral law. Every man 
of law; as to the right of ownership: a principal power of laying claim to a thing in court and of using it in any 
way not prohibited by natural law; both in: Opus Nonaginta Dierum, ed. by R F Bennett and J G Sikes, ch. 
 2 (Manchester: Manchester University Press,  1940),  304,  310. See also Arthur Stephen McGrade, ‘Ockham and 
the Birth of Individual Rights’, in Authority and Power. Studies in Medieval Law and Government presented to 
Walter Ullmann on his Seventieth Birthday, ed. by Brian Tierney and Patrick Linehan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,  1980),  149–151. See also Michel Villey, ‘La Genèse du droit subjectif chez Guillaume d’Occam’, 
Archives de Philosophie du Droit  9 (1964),  97–127; Heinrich Rommen, Die ewige Wiederkehr des Naturrechts 
(München: J. Kösel,  1947),  60; Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy. Ockham to Suarez (New york: 
Doubleday, vol. III,  1953),  51; Arthur Stephen McGrade, The Political Thought of William of Ockham. Personal 
and Institutional Principles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1974). But see also Brian Tierney, 
Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought.  1150–1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
 1982); John N Figgis, Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius.  1414–1625 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,  1931); Tuck, Natural Rights Theories; Bogdan Szlachta, ‘Nowożytny przełom w pojmowaniu 
prawa naturalnego’, in Kształtowanie postawy obywatelskiej, ed. by P. Lenartowicz (Kraków: Wydawnictwo 
WAM,  1997),  35–80. Scotists’ nominalism meant a crisis in Scholastic method, a quarrel about ‘universals’ 
and an anticipation of the modern theory of powers-rights. The  vindication of the will’s primacy over the 
intellect led to the denial that ethical values can have any other foundation but the will of God that imposes 
them. The  notion of God as an unlimited and arbitrary power implied the reduction of all moral laws to 
inscrutable manifestations of divine omnipotence. The basis of the ‘natural system of ethics’ was discarded. 
Natural law ceases to be a bridge between God and man. It affords no indication of the existence of an eternal 
and immutable order. It no longer constitutes the measure of man’s dignity and of his capacity for participation 
in that order, a standard of good and evil available to all rational creatures, because for nominalists an action 
was not good thanks to its suitability with the essential nature of man but thanks to God’s arbitral will. Validity 
of the norms was founded not on the standards of God’s reason as well as man’s reason but only on God’s 
absolute will. Law was not reason but will, pure will without any foundation in reality, without foundation 
in the essential nature of things. It is as if the notion of sovereignty was applied here to the divine law-giver 
himself. The notion of sovereignty of God as legibus solutus became the pivot of Calvin’s ethics and theology 
and later the foundation of the modern conception of sovereignty as well as the new conception of natural 
law which was the product of the Age of Reason. But this influence was somehow paradoxical because the 
revival of natural law which took place at the turn of the  16th and  17th century was essentially a rejection of 
the nominalist or voluntarist theory of law. Thus Grotius’s famous proposition that natural law would retain 
its validity even if God did not exist, which appears as a turning point in the history of Western thought, was 
the answer to the challenge not of rational-realistic ethics of Aquinas, but of voluntarist and nominalist ones. 
It meant the assertion that command is not the essence of law and that natural law is independent of God’s will. 
This meaning goes in the same direction as a convenient summary of Catholic conception which was given at 
the beginning of the  17th century by Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suárez, who also took the view that natural law 
does not depend on the will ‘of any superior’, especially the will of the absolute monarch.
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possesses the natural inclinations to the development of his possibilities and the attainment 
of the good for man. Every man also possesses the light of reason whereby he can reflect 
on these fundamental inclinations of his nature and promulgate to himself the natural law, 
which is the totality of the universal precepts or dictates of right reason concerning the 
good which is to be followed and the evil which is to be shunned. By the light of his own 
natural reason, therefore, man can arrive at some knowledge of natural law. Since this law 
is a participation in or reflection of eternal law and so far as the reflection concerns human 
beings and their free acts, man is not left in ignorance of eternal law which is the ultimate 
rule of all conduct.4
For Aquinas, therefore, it is human reason which is the proximate or immediate 
promulgator of natural law. This law is not without a relation to something above itself; for it 
is, as we have seen, the reflection or participation in eternal law. Inasmuch as it is immediately 
promulgated by human reason, we can speak of a certain autonomy of practical reason. 
This does not mean that man can alter the natural law which is founded in his nature. But it 
means that the human being does not receive the law simply by imposition from above: he 
recognises or can recognise its inherent rationality and binding force, and he promulgates 
it to himself.5 In Aquinas’s conception of natural law as the expression of man’s dignity and 
power, man is the only being created to participate intellectually and actively in the rational 
order of the universe. Man is called to do so because of his rational nature. It is the light of 
natural reason which enables us to discern good from evil. St. Thomas’s notion of the light of 
reason is of great importance. Man is conceived to hold the unique position of being at the 
same time a subject of God and His co-operator. However, man participates in two worlds. 
The order of the precepts of natural law corresponds to the order of his natural inclination, 
includes the qualities which he has in common with all created beings as well as those 
which are distinctive of his own rational nature. What he has in common with all created 
things is the desire for self-preservation. Hence the first group of the precepts of natural law 
comprises all that makes for the preservation of human life. But man also has similarities 
with animated beings with a  further inclination to more specific ends. Consequently, it 
is right to say that ‘what nature has taught all animals’ pertains to natural law – such as 
sexual relationships, the rearing of offspring and the like. Finally, there is in man a certain 
inclination to know the truth about God and to live in society. All those actions pertain to 
4 The natural law is nothing else but a participation of the eternal law in a rational creature (Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae,  1a  2ae,  91.2).
5 It is clear – says Aquinas – that the whole community of the universe is governed by divine reason, by eternal 
law; all things are subject to divine Providence and are measured and regulated by this kind of rational law; all 
participate to some degree in it, in so far as they derive from it certain inclinations to those actions and aims which 
are proper to them. But, of all others, rational creatures are subject to divine Providence in a very special way; 
being themselves participators in Providence itself, in that they control their own actions and the actions of others. 
So they have a certain share in divine reason itself, deriving therefrom a natural inclination to such actions and 
ends as are fitting. This participation in eternal law by rational creatures is called natural law; natural law which 
is nothing else than the impression of the divine light in us and participation of eternal law in rational creatures 
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natural law to which man has a natural inclination: and among such it is proper to man to 
seek to act according to reason, which gives first principles of rightness for everybody and is 
equally known by every one or the same for all as a norm of right conduct and is equally well 
known by everyone.6
The order of the precepts of natural law follows the order of natural inclinations; and – as 
a consequence – these precepts as well as these inclinations or tendencies are directing man 
towards his ultimate good, giving him knowledge of what is necessary for the right ordering 
of his life and also the conviction that he should live in society with other men. Aquinas 
thought of man as tending naturally and inevitably towards his perfection, towards the 
actualisation of his potentialities as man, towards his final end or good. And he thought of 
man’s reason as discerning the acts necessary for the attainment of this end and ordering 
them while forbidding their contraries. In  this sense, obligation or norm is imposed by 
practical reason, binding the free will to perform the necessary acts to attain the final end 
or man’s good and to abstain from acts which are incompatible with its attainment. But, at 
the same time, for Aquinas, one may act and one has iura only on the foundation of natural 
law and in the area which presents its objective norms. In his doctrine, we have no modern 
natural rights theory although we have natural law theory. Something can be said to be 
according to the ius naturale in two ways, said Aquinas when he spoke about man’s natural 
life. One, if nature inclines us to it: such as not to harm another human being. The other, 
if nature does not prescribe the opposite: so that we can say a man is naked under the ius 
naturale, since he received no clothes from nature but invented them himself. In this way ‘the 
common possession of all things, and the equal liberty of all is said to be according to the ius 
naturale: for distinctions between possessions and slavery were not the products of nature 
but were made by human reason for the advantage of human life’.7 In the state of nature, 
men have no rights, because the ius naturale is neutral in the areas of personal servitude 
and private property. In spite of all modern natural rights theory, there are no prima facie 
rights to men; men do not have a prima facie natural right to absolute liberty any more than 
they have a prima facie natural right to dominate other men.8
Aquinas generally used ius and lex – right and law – as interchangeable terms, pointing 
that legalism should follow the grain of reality and that continuity between implanted right 
and enacted law should be kept. Whereas medieval jurists generally spoke of ius naturale 
6 Ibid. 94.2. Like the ancient Roman lawyer Ulpian, Aquinas pointed out that man has something in common 
with all created beings, with plants and animals for example; like all medieval Christian lawyers, he also 
pointed out that man has something in common with a supernatural Being (God) or beings like angels but not 
only with Him or them. As to the relation between negative borders of freedom of human legislation Aquinas 
said that the validity of law depends upon its justice. But in human affairs a thing is said to be just when it accords 
aright with the rule of reason: and, as we have already seen, the first rule of reason is natural law. Thus all humanly 
enacted laws are in accord with reason to the extent that they derive from natural law. And if a human law is at 
variance in any particular with natural law, it is no longer legal, but rather a corruption of law (Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae,  1a  2ae,  95.2).
7 Ibid. 94.5.
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and theologians of lex naturalis, he was inclined to reverse the usage, preferring lex in 
his judicial treatise and ius in his theological treatise on the cardinal virtue of justice. 
Lex was not ius precisely, but in some manner it was its rational expression, because ius 
signified an objective quality.9 If legislation was a part of the practical wisdom of governing 
the community, one man could rightfully control another only by showing a reason for 
his power: even omnipotence cannot break the order of truth, but the true and rational 
legislator ought to have prudentia regnativa, a type of prudence, the intellectual and moral 
virtue.10 A  legislator’s recta ratio is not so closely linked with ius naturale in Aquinas’s 
doctrine as some contemporary commentators suppose and therefore there is no contrast 
between ius naturale and lex naturalis.11
For St. Thomas, lex means much more than a positive statement and very much more 
indeed than written law; he often speaks of ius positivum instead of lex positiva, of lex 
naturalis instead of ius naturale, and  –  as Brown has supposed  –  he uses ius and lex 
metonymously in respect of all of the following kinds of ius–lex: divine, natural, positive 
and human.12 He does indeed draw a distinction between these terms, but in both of them 
he presents the same rational substance. Only those iura and leges are valid which are 
rational – however, not as man’s rationality but as the rationality of God and His order. On 
the other hand, the iura are only valid if they have a legal foundation. It is an important 
thesis because the substance of personal rights is connected not with personal power 
or dominium but with rational action which directs man to his ultimate end. We have 
already seen, however, that for Aquinas, a Christian theologian, man has a supernatural 
final end or supreme good, the attainment of which transcends his natural power and 
directs his natural rights through his natural inclinations as well as through the norms 
of natural law.13
9 See, first of all, Aquinas, Summa Theologiae,  1a  2ae,  105.2 ad.  3,  2a  2ae,  57.1 ad  1,  2.
10 See Thomas Gilby, Principality and Polity. Aquinas and the Rise of State Theory in the West (London: Longmans, 
Green,  1958),  125–128.
11 See Vernon J Bourke, ‘Is Thomas Aquinas a Natural Law Ethicist?’, The Monist  58. (1974),  62–63.
12 Oscar J Brown, Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas. An Approach to an Integral Interpretation of the 
Thomistic Doctrine of Law (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,  1981), Appendix I: ‘Ius’ and ‘Lex’ 
in Aquinas (p.  174).
13 In the Catechism of the Catholic Church (n.  36) from  1992 we read: ‘The Church, holds and teaches that God, 
the first principle and last end of all things, can be known with certainty from the created world by the natural 
light of human reason’ (with references not only to Vatican Council I, Dei Filius  2, but also to Vatican Council 
II, Dei Verbum  6). Without this capacity, man would not be able to welcome God’s revelation. Man has this 
capacity because he is created ‘in the image of God’ (Gen  1:27). But at the same time, as we read in the next 
canon (ibid. n.  37), in the historical conditions in which he finds himself […] man experiences many difficulties in 
coming to know God by the light of reason alone: Though human reason is, strictly speaking, truly capable by its 
own natural power and light of attaining to a true and certain knowledge of the one personal God, who watches 
over and controls the world by his providence, and of the natural law written in our hearts by the Creator; yet 
there are many obstacles which prevent reason from the effective and fruitful use of this inborn faculty. For the 
truths that concern the relations between God and man wholly transcend the visible order of things, and, if they 
are translated into human action and influence it, they call for self-surrender and abnegation. The human mind, 
in its turn, is hampered in the attaining of such truths, not only by the impact of the senses and the imagination, 
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The  identification of man’s good with ‘happiness’ or with self-perfection may easily 
give the impression that Aquinas’s ideal was purely individualistic and even egoistic in 
an unpleasant sense. yet he regarded life in society as being prescribed by natural law. 
That is to say, he recognised a natural tendency of human beings to live in society with 
his fellows, not only in a smaller group of the immediate family circle but also in those 
larger groups which (in their developed form) are called states or political communities. 
Social life is thus founded on human nature itself, and both families and states are natural 
communities. Reason, reflecting on man’s fundamental inclinations, says that these 
societies ought to be formed inasmuch as they are necessary for the development of man’s 
potentialities. It is natural for man to be a social and a political animal, living in community; 
and this is more true of him than of any other animal, a fact which is shown by his natural 
necessities,14 meaning bodily as well as spiritual needs. Society is therefore not a purely 
artificial construction but a natural institution as a result of man being what he is. And 
as founded on human nature, it is willed by God, who created man. This does not mean, 
of course, that the historical divisions into nations and states are dictated by God but that 
there should be a civil or political society or societies willed by God, as is shown by the fact 
that He created man who cannot attain his full stature without society.15
Furthermore, every society requires direction and government. For Aquinas it is 
a mistake to think, unlike both St. Augustine and Locke, that government exists simply 
in order to keep peace and punish evildoers. According to him, government would be 
required even if there were no evildoers and even if no one was inclined to disturb the 
peace. St. Augustine was inclined to say that the state was a result of man’s Fall and political 
authority existed primarily because fallen human beings needed coercive power to restrain 
their evil tendencies and to punish crime. Locke spoke of anti-rational passions which 
incline men to break the law of nature. But these were not at all Aquinas’s opinions. Man 
is by nature a social animal. Hence in the state of innocence (if there had been no Fall) men 
would have lived in society. But a common social life of many individuals could not exist unless 
there were someone in control to attend to the common good.16 Government, like society, is 
natural and willed by God. It exists primarily to care for the common good, because for 
the good life of the community three things are required. Firstly, that the community should 
be established in the unity of peace. Secondly, that the community, united in the bond of 
peace, should be directed to good action […]. Thirdly, that through the ruler’s diligence there 
should be a  sufficient supply of the necessities for a good life.17 The government therefore 
exists to preserve internal peace and to take care of the community, to promote the moral 
easily persuade themselves that what they would not like to be true is false or at least doubtful (with reference to 
the Encyclical Humani generis by the Roman Pope Pius XII).
14 St. Thomas Aquinas, On the Government of Rulers. De regimine principium, transl. by James M Blythe 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,  1997),  1,1.
15 See Frederick Copleston, Aquinas (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,  1955),  227–229.
16 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae,  1a  2ae,  96.4.
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well-being of citizens, so far as this can be done by legislation supported by sanctions, and 
to provide citizens with a sufficient supply of material necessities. In Aquinas’s doctrine, 
there is no place for a contract which constitutes society or government.
3. NEW (MODERN, ABOVE ALL LIBERAL) PROPOSITIONS: 
RIGHTS BEFORE LAW
Since the function of the state as well as the function of its legislator or legislators is to 
promote the common good which has no individualistic substance, the criterion of good 
and bad in legislation is its relation, discerned by reason, to common good and not to the 
interests of individuals or groups. It does not imply that every precept and prohibition of 
natural law should be embodied in legislation, as will be thought for example by English 
Puritans. But the state is not entitled to pass legislation which runs counter to natural 
law in any case. Every human law has the nature of law in so far as it is derived from the 
law of nature. If in any case it is incompatible with the natural law, it will not be law, but 
a perversion of law.18 And, therefore, Aquinas may say also that the will of the prince has 
the power of law only when it is rational and directed towards the well-being of the whole 
community as a perfect whole,19 while in any other sense the will of the prince becomes an 
evil rather than law.20
From this view of the relation of human positive law to natural law it naturally follows 
that just laws are binding while unjust laws are not binding in conscience. A law is unjust, 
says Aquinas, if it imposes burdens on the citizens not for the common good but to 
satisfy the cupidity or the ambition of the legislator; if in enacting the law the legislator 
goes beyond the powers committed to him; or if burdens are imposed in an unfair and 
disproportionate manner. Laws of this kind are acts of violence rather than laws […] they 
do not bind in conscience unless observance of them is required in order to avoid scandal or 
public disturbance. Laws can also be unjust by contravening divine positive law, namely the 
precepts of the Decalogue, and laws of this sort ought not to be obeyed.21 The sovereignty of 
the ruler or legislator does not cancel the notion of legal obligation. Positive law does not 
exhaust the whole range of legal experience. There may be laws other than the commands 
of the sovereign, laws with a  different structure yet nevertheless binding and formally 
perfect. Natural law and the laws of the international community (ius gentium) are devoid 
of sanctions but both are properly called laws and are binding even for the sovereign. Like 
Albericus Gentilis, one of the founders of modern international law, Aquinas may say that 
18 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae,  1a  2ae,  95.2.
19 Ibid. 90.2, concl.
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the ‘absolute’ prince is a prince who is above positive law but under natural law and under 
the law of nations.22
After St. Thomas, the compelling law was being increasingly associated with state 
legislation and moral law with religious teachings. As a consequence, we find early modern 
Christianity marked by two alternative understandings of the superior divine law: either 
the law of juridical importance (in Puritanism, Presbyterianism and some other Calvinist 
denominations) or moral law (in Catholicism). The  tensions in  16th century Europe, 
greatly inspired by nominalism and voluntarism, involved the essential reformulation of 
the functions of law, usually ascribed to Hugo Grotius. According to his new formula, 
so perceptively diagnosed by the Jesuit Naphta, universal human reason continued to 
be the source of fixed natural norms but the horizon of their application was no  longer 
supernatural; instead of salvation, the law should rather be concerned with the conditions 
of social peace. Further on, the French ‘politicians’ went on to conceptualise the legislators 
solely focused on peaceful, interpersonal coexistence, just like in Augustine’s ‘earthly 
cities’. Finally, Jean Bodin emphasised the role of the commanding monarch whose power 
was to determine the conditions of peace and enforce their observance.23
However, although commonly labelled as a  founder of absolutism, Bodin (following 
the ‘politicians’) did not justify the unconditional primacy of the law-maker. Instead, the 
choice of religion and ‘family property’ were those elements which had to be respected 
by all law-makers, thus setting boundaries to their legislation. To impose the monarch’s 
own religion on others and put arbitrary restrictions on their properties was no  longer 
allowed. That way, let us remark, the limits of legislation were again defined with reference 
to earthly communities only. At the same time, freedom of religion allowed for alternative 
visions of salvation: while some Christians favoured the pathway marked by the law of 
revelation, others respected the limits set by natural law. Even more importantly, there 
was no agreement on the relation of natural individual rights to divine law: some derived 
them from the law-making act of God, others preferred to deduce them from universal 
human nature. Except for early modern republicanism, the split within Western 
Christianity brought about not only the dispute of Protestants with the Catholic schools 
of Salamanca and Coimbra but also the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, equally critical of 
Catholics, Puritans, common law and the ‘divine right of kings’ theory. Hobbes rejected 
the contexts of religion and property, and advocated the theory of the state of nature 
with individuals led by a self-preservation instinct and holding inborn rights; not to the 
pursuit of salvation or social peace but to all self-preserving actions. Hobbes’s project was 
revolutionary in postulating the existence of natural egoistic rights whose only aim was to 
preserve a  living body, with no  normative boundaries preventing the individual from 
22 Albericus Gentilis, Regales Disputationes Tres,  1605  (Disp. I, De Potestate Regia Absoluta,  17). For further 
information see Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves, Natural Law. An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (London: 
Hutchinson University Library,  1957),  67–68.
23 See above all Arthur P Monahan, From Personal Duties towards Personal Rights. Late Medieval and Early 
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hurting others. No ‘superior law’ was to be respected either by the individual or legislator 
(‘state’ or ‘Leviathan’) whose function was to establish fundamental norms of the law of 
nature, thereby restricting rights of individuals in exchange for protecting their bodies and 
peaceful coexistence.
What is interesting here, however, is not so much the limitation of rights by the ‘state’ but 
the absence of moral duties. By negating ‘positive political theology’ and God’s interference 
in the world of politics, Hobbes both disregarded any supreme law in formulating norms of 
the law of nature and made all moral issues secondary to legal resolutions. Consequently, 
no  morality, either divine or natural, could any longer justify the disobedience to the 
legislator called ‘state’. Even individuals were only allowed to execute their inborn rights 
if they did not violate the norms established to keep peaceful coexistence; in other words, 
individuals might not seek peace but had to respect its conditions. When Hobbes denied the 
autonomy of the Church and identified state sovereignty with supreme moral jurisdiction, 
he was not far away from Erastianism with its recognition of ‘state’ as the only source of 
the Church’s legislative, judicial and sacramental rights. Hobbes made the political order 
self-centred, focused solely on making and keeping peace between individuals, on public 
safety and order. The problem he faced was how to personally represent the impersonal 
state which is similar to ‘person’:24 when its assumed unity proved elusive and many actors 
(also religious) claimed the right to representation, and vicious power struggles began. 
The thing is that neither their participants, nor Hobbes’s followers respected any ‘supreme 
law’. Admittedly, to restrict legislative freedom, John Locke went on to present a catalogue 
of inviolable inborn rights to be protected by the norm of the law of nature not derived from 
the ‘state’ but from human reason. But even this project emphasised agreement as the only 
conception of civil society with its principles and, as such, it disregarded the role of universal 
religious morality. Equally critical of atheists and ‘papists’, Locke basically echoed Hobbes 
in his concern with the conditions of peace between individuals and nothing more. Unlike 
classical projects or even the project of the Salamanca School, his norm of the law of nature 
was to protect inborn rights, not inclinations. It was these rights, further on transformed 
into human rights, which were supposed to allow individuals the unrestrained articulation 
of their needs and preferences. They defined the ‘juridical boundaries’ of a subject’s freedom 
which could be violated by no law-maker – the institutions of civil society included.
The  modern theory of the law of nature is, properly speaking, first of all a  theory of 
rights which are restricted or guaranteed by norms or a norm named the law of nature. 
A  momentous change has taken place under the cover of the same verbal expressions. 
24 The Hobbesian commonwealth, said David Runciman, is an association of individuals who have all agreed to 
abide by certain rules. It is an association which has no substantive end of its own, beyond the end which its 
members share as individuals and which conditions the terms of their original agreement – ‘namely, the Peace 
of the Subjects within themselves, and their Defence against a  common Enemy’ (Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 
[London: Dent,  1931],  150). ‘Peace is secured through the rule of law […]. Hobbes’s civil association is a person’ 
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The  ius naturale of the modern political philosopher is no  longer either lex naturalis of 
the medieval moralist or ius naturale of the Roman lawyer. These different conceptions 
have only the name in common. This significant fact was pointed out by Hobbes: though 
they speak of this subject use to confound ius and lex, right and law: yet they ought to be 
distinguished; because right consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear: whereas law determineth, 
and bindeth to one of them: so that law and right differ as much, as obligation and liberty.25 
Following this distinction, he argued that civil war is caused by each individual claiming 
the right to judge the law in accordance with their subjective standard of conscience or 
‘private judgement’.26
The different meanings of the word ius were for a long time known to the lawyers who 
had been brought up in the study of Roman law. They carefully distinguished between 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective right’, between the norma agendi (the rule of action) and the 
facultas agendi (the right to act) which can both be indicated by the same name of ius. But 
they never overlooked the fact, which Hobbes seems either to ignore or to implicitly deny, 
that the two meanings of ius are not antithetical but correlative. In the language of the law 
schools and as we have seen with St. Thomas, ius could be used in an ‘objective’ as well as in 
a ‘subjective’ sense: but the latter always presupposes the former. There is a facultas agendi 
inasmuch as there is a norma agendi. There is a ‘right’ inasmuch as there is a law. But for 
the great majority of modern law nature writers, Hobbes’s anarchical conception of natural 
right as opposed to natural law was crucial.27 Even Locke in the Two Treatises of Government 
argued that in a system of popular sovereignty, members would withdraw their consent 
and revolt whenever a law would conflict with their private interest, claiming that it would 
contravene the public good. Although he said that the freedom of an Englishman consists 
in his liberty to dispose of his actions and possessions according to the laws of England, his 
emphasis was shifting more and more from the objective to the subjective meaning of ius. 
For him individual human freedom was connected not with the ultimate end or good of 
man, nor with the norms of natural law which obliges all men, but with the right of the 
individual who has the power quite similar to that which nominalists and voluntarists had 
given to God alone. In his doctrine on individuals, very similar to the Byzantine prince, 
25 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.14.
26 Ibid. II.29. Leo Strauss said in his famous lectures: We can overcome this danger only by considering the fact 
that for every conscientious scholar the problem of natural right is not a partisan affair. At a superficial glance, 
the issue of natural right presents itself today as a matter of party allegiance. Looking around us we see two hostile 
camps, heavily fortified and strictly guarded. One is occupied by the liberals of various descriptions – to use this 
somewhat loose term; the other by the Catholic and non-Catholic disciples of Thomas Aquinas. But both armies, 
and in addition those who prefer to sit on the fence or to hide their heads in the sand, are, if I may heap metaphor 
on metaphor, in the same boat. They are all modern men. No matter how neutral we may be, we are all in the grip 
of the same dilemma (Leo Strauss, Six lectures  1949,  7). See also Ernst Levy, ‘Natural Law in Roman Thought’, 
Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris  15, (1949),  7; John Walter Jones, Historical Introduction to the Theory of 
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,  1940),  100–108.
27 See positions by d’Entrèves, Natural Law,  59–60 (for the majority of these writers ‘natural law was the necessary 
presupposition of natural right’,  60) and the opposite view by Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes 
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were the living embodiments of law (lex animata) and their will and law became correlative 
notions. In his natural right theories, one may see once again the old idea of Roman and 
glossators’ texts of a supreme and ultimate human power from which all laws proceed; the 
idea which undermines all possibility of serious natural law thinking because natural law 
is not a proper law if sovereignty is the essential condition of legal experience, as it is not 
possible to conceive of a law of nature when command is the essence of law.28
If a rule may be laid down as a command, we cannot distinguish the ‘compelling’ and 
the ‘directing’ aspects of law (vis coactiva vs vis directiva). Hence, while for Aquinas the 
‘directing’ aspect of law was crucial because it was the element of justice, for Locke both 
aspects are identified. He said not only that political power is a right of making laws,29 but 
also that the state of nature, the pre-political state, has a law of nature to govern it, which 
obliges every one, supposing the law of nature as a norm or set of norms has no political 
character if only political power is a right of making this norm or these norms. Locke said 
at the same time that reason, which is that law (of nature), reaches all mankind who will but 
consult it, that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, 
health, liberty, or possessions.30
In  this context we must ask a  question about the primary rights as a  capacity of the 
individual who realises his personal ability or power over law as a  set of norms which 
rules the actions of individuals. And a second question: what is a substantial relationship 
between norm of the law of nature and such individual ability or power? Locke writes, on 
the one hand, that all men may be restrained from invading others’ rights, and from doing 
hurt to one another31 because rights of every man create a property in his own person.32 
And, on the other hand, that the law of nature willeth the peace and preservation of all 
mankind.33 In  these words he creates a  very important doctrine for all liberal tradition 
and modern natural law thinkers on the priority of rights before law. Now, law as the set 
of norms, identified with human reason, has no objective context and is only a guarantor 
of individual rights and as such does not determine individual ability or power; it occupies 
the second position whilst the first is taken up by personal rights or property.
Locke calls property or dominium the right of every man in the state of nature to dispose 
of himself and his possessions as he thinks fit; for him every man has a property in his own 
person, by which he means that a man has a natural right, limited only by God’s purposes 
and by the obligation to respect the same right of others, to do as he pleases. He may not 
destroy himself because he is God’s creature. His property in himself is not independent 
of God’s will but is not connected with God’s reason – as in Aquinas’s doctrine. There is 
no eternal law whose norms are implemented to all created beings in the form of natural 
28 D’Entrèves, Natural Law,  66.
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inclinations, with which all rational natural law norms are compatible. Rather, there is 
only one inclination, which directs the individual not to his supernatural and ultimate end 
but reduces him to the natural or material reality and is a foundation of his rights but not 
law. As a consequence, God alone guarantees not the essence of law as a set of norms, but 
the essence of rights as a personal ability/power. The state of nature is not a state of war, 
but not because every individual has a natural inclination to live in a political community, 
but because this state is quite different from the state of civil society. It is not a state of 
war because reason governs in it, pure reason, free from every passion and every pre-
rational, even biological inclination, which knows the natural rights of every individual. 
The substance of it is very simple since reason or the law of nature knows only one norm: 
you may not invade the rights of others; if there are no rights, the law of reason will be quite 
empty.
But here Locke has an important problem: in the state of nature men had the law of 
nature to guide them but they, from time to time, must have differed about the law or about 
its application to particular cases. They must therefore have felt a need for an established, 
settled known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right 
and wrong, and also for a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determinate all 
differences according to the established law, and lastly for a power to back and support the 
sentence when right, and to give it due execution.34 By putting themselves under government, 
men do not give up all their rights, but only those which must be surrendered for the 
common good, which is only the preservation of freedom or property or a set of personal, 
passive rights. They give up only two active rights or powers: to interpret the norm of the 
law of nature and to punish. Government, which is like a society and not like a natural 
institution, has no absolute authority, but only as much as it needs for the common good 
which is defined now as a sum of individual interests and in no sense as the good of a whole 
community. The law of nature, this only one norm, stands – says Locke – an eternal rule to 
all men, legislators as well as others.35
The  Two Treatises is the most radical answer that has been given yet to the main 
moral-jurisprudential  17th century question of who has and who has not the ‘right’ to 
political power. For Locke, each individual does have and should have the political 
power in the juridical form of personal rights. Therefore, first, prior to and independent 
of the establishment of institutionalised forms of government, people are able to govern 
themselves; and, second, the power of institutionalised forms of government is derived 
from the original powers of the individual members of the political society. But, third, 
and most importantly, which in some sense connects Locke with Aquinas but makes him 
34 Ibid. II.ix.124.
35 Ibid. II.xi.134. On the other hand, for Locke the same law of nature that does by this means give us property, does 
also bound that property too. ‘God has given us all things richly’ (I Tim. vi.17), is the voice of reason confirmed by 
inspiration. But how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life 
before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, 
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quite different from the majority of modern natural freedom theorists, individuals have 
not only the right to defend themselves and their possessions from attack, even to kill the 
attacker if necessary, and not only this right of defence, but also political power, having 
it individually and not as a corporate body. By arguing in the Two Treatises that the state 
of nature has a  law of nature enforced by the passive system Locke showed that natural 
freedom is not the Hobbesian ‘absence of restraint’ (or ‘negative liberty’) but – like in the 
doctrine of Aquinas – the juridical form of freedom as action within the boundaries of law 
and is subject to it.36 It stems from the constitutive role of the law of nature or law of reason 
that individuals who transgress it, in civil or natural society, by using ‘Force without Right’ 
or manifesting a ‘declared design’ to do so, place themselves outside moral human society, 
and thereby in a ‘state of war’.37
Locke’s innovation here – one may say38 – is to argue that the fundamental natural law 
(or law of nature) is not self-preservation but the ‘preservation of mankind’. However, 
we must remember about the foundations of his law of nature which are quite different 
from Aquinas as a consequence of his individualistic and not communitarian premises, 
as well as his appeal to natural rights and not to natural inclinations on which the norms 
of natural law are grounded. If we do not remember Locke’s individualistic premises, we 
may not understand his radical breaking with the Aristotelian–Thomistic tradition and 
make the same error as Tully, who has written that natural property rights are (in Locke’s 
doctrine) use-rights within a larger framework of rights and duties to preserve the community 
(mankind) and regulated by everyone through the accusatory system.39 We may not be able 
to see that for this classic of reason in early liberalism, which is natural law, teaches all 
mankind who will but consult it, that […] no one ought to harm another in his life, health, 
liberty, or possessions, namely in his personal and subjective rights, but only if his own self-
preservation is secured. We may also not be able to see the anti-naturalistic consequences 
of Locke’s contractual conceptions of society and state, as well as his identifications of right 
or ius with power or dominium, ‘objective’ and ‘subjective right’ and the norma agendi 
and the facultas agendi, which are crucial for modern political philosophy, especially the 
liberal one.
4. NATURAL LAW VS LAW OF NATURE
As we have already observed, there is a clear tension between natural law and the law of 
nature: advocates of the former put emphasis on the realisation of inborn inclinations, view 
36 Ibid. II.iv.22; II.vi.57. See James Tully, ‘Locke on Liberty’, in Conceptions of Liberty in Political Philosophy, ed. by 
Zbigniew Pelczynski and John Gray (New york: St Martin’s Press,  1984).
37 Locke, Two Treatises, II.iii.16,  19.
38 See, for example, James Tully, ‘Locke’, in The Cambridge History of Political Thought  1450–1700, John H Burns 
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rights as manifestations of this realisation and natural law as a set of norms protecting the 
inclinations and indicating the limits of rightful actions. Advocates of the latter emphasise 
inborn rights of the subject whose execution may not be restrained either by other 
individuals, the state or Church. For proponents of natural law, state legislation is supposed 
to protect inclinations and respect the ‘supreme law’ they have been secured by in the first 
place. For proponents of the law of nature, state legislation is only supposed to interpret 
the inviolable status of the rights; the ‘supreme law’ can still be found there but only as 
a guarantor of the rights to live, stay healthy, move places and dispose of properties, not 
as a pathway to salvation. Individuals are then protected against the normative claims of 
both the state, Church and groups they belong to: at any time the individuals can separate 
from these ‘entities’ for the sake of their rights. Last but not least, while for the advocates 
of natural law family is a ‘natural’ group or even a sacramental union established to raise 
offspring, for advocates of the law of nature it is merely a dissoluble civil union based on 
mutual agreement.
As long as there were widespread mass parties that were supposed to reflect the interests 
of nations or ‘social classes’, so, let us say, until the  1950s, there was a tendency to picture 
individuals as parts of some bigger whole (‘class’, nation or even Church) and identify their 
particular natures with group particularities. Actually, it is only the slogans of the ‘end 
of history’ and global individualistic project of the  1990s that finally dissolved national 
and religious particularities. From that time on, individuality has clearly been prioritised 
and simplified liberal arguments have been used to picture all groups (apart from 
‘cultural groups’) as critical points of reference and foundations for so-called populisms. 
The struggle of this simplified liberalism with populist projects can easily be called the sign 
of our times. Among the ‘populisms’, there is also the Catholic-based project with natural 
law as a critical counterpoint to the liberal understanding of inborn human rights.
Attempts by the Church to stay independent of political powers and exert influence on 
the political sphere only by means of citizens were contested in the  17th and  18th century 
first by regalism and then by democratic tendencies where the king was replaced by the 
people (or ‘political nation’). Thanks to the doctrine of sovereignty, it is the people who 
then held exclusive rights to legislate and determine the limits of individual liberties, thus 
deciding on the content of law with no intermediate bodies like communities of believers. 
Erastian tendencies got involved in the theory of democracy with Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
who made the expression of ‘general will’ by the sovereign people into the only source of 
legal order and thereby sublated the Christian conflicts over loyalty either to God or to 
the emperor by the general will of free and equal individuals: free to legislate and equal 
in their legislative voice. Consequently, the sovereign people got more powerful than the 
Roman emperor. Rousseau’s democratic doctrine justified – at least theoretically – both the 
dominance of state over Church and other communities subject to the ‘general will’, and the 
dominance of this will over ‘private wills’ of believers. All intermediate bodies, including 
the Church, threatened the identification of particular wills with the ‘general will’ and, 
as such, they could be abolished as an obstacle on the way to freedom. This freedom was 
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as the institution mainly focused on particular interests of its members. Both parents and 
children were believed to realise their freedom only if and as long as they belonged to the 
people and served it, which made it justified for the people to legally impose methods of 
raising and educating a child. If we add to this that the family was only supposed to care 
for the productivity of bodies, not for future salvation, the path to biopolitics focused on 
the discipline of bodies was left wide open.
It is not this tendency, however, which has recently been given primacy, but the 
individualistic one. Unlike early modern individualism, it is not so much focused 
on defining the limits of state activity and establishing the untouchable private sphere 
but on guaranteeing individuals the execution of their rights – freed from the outdated 
restrictions of legal and moral nature. As a  result, Churches have been made into 
associations of individuals professing the same religion. The so-called liberal separatism is 
increasingly calling for state neutrality with moral norms treated as particular normative 
propositions not binding for all the citizens. Admittedly, it is already philosophers of the 
Enlightenment who deprived the state of its religious functions and confined them solely 
to peacekeeping, but the peace could then be preserved by the Voltairian ‘enlightened 
monarch’. Now the main actors are individuals whose choices determine the foundation 
of universally binding norms  –  usually based on the arithmetic majority principle. 
This tendency has also been understood by the Catholic Church which – beginning with 
the pontificate of Pope John XXIII – has abandoned the traditional primacy of truth over 
freedom in favour of the rights of a human person.
5. CONTEMPORARy CATHOLIC POSITION
We know that from the Christian (and among others also from Catholic) perspective, God 
(not only as Creator but also as Lord) transcends all creatures. Man, as His creation, is 
by nature and vocation a religious being. Coming from God, going toward God, man lives 
a fully human life only if he freely lives by his bond with God.40 Thanks to Him man knows 
the moral law, the work of divine Wisdom, which prescribes for man the ways, the rules of 
conduct that lead to the promised beatitude; it proscribes the ways of evil which turn him 
away from God and his love. It is at once firm in its precepts and, in its promises, worthy of 
love.41 It is moral law, not created in the ‘political processes’; such moral law presupposes the 
rational order, established among creatures for their good and to serve their final end, by the 
power, wisdom, and goodness of the Creator. All law finds its first and ultimate truth in the 
eternal law. Law is declared and established by reason as a participation in the providence of 
the living God, Creator and Redeemer of all.42 It is also natural law, and not personal rights 
as natural rights, which participates in His providence; such moral natural law – as a set 
40 Catechism of the Catholic Church, n.  44.
41 Ibid. n.  1950.
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of norms and not rights – expresses the original moral sense which enables man to discern 
by reason the good and the evil; they are written and engraved in the soul of each and every 
man, because it is human reason ordaining him to do good and forbidding him to sin. But 
this command of human reason – as said at the end of the  19th century by the Roman Pope 
Leo XIII, often presented as a founder of the Catholic social teaching – would not have the 
force of law if it were not the voice and interpreter of a higher reason to which our spirit and 
our freedom must be submitted.43 These natural law norms are not only immutable and 
permanent, and hence independent of the variations of history and the various cultures, 
ideologies and religions, but also universal in [their] precepts and [their] authority extends 
to all men, not only to Christians but also to non-Christians, to atheists or agnostics as well 
as to the believers of other monotheistic religions. Natural law expresses the dignity of the 
person and determines the basis for his fundamental rights and duties.44 But if it expresses 
the dignity of the person and determines the basis for his fundamental rights and duties, 
at the same time it shows the negative borders for human actions, also for actions of every 
legislator. We must also know that natural law – once again: as a set of norms which every 
man and every member of the legislative bodies knows, should or could know – provides 
the indispensable moral foundation for building the human community.45
We know that the natural right theory in the Aristotelian or Aristotelian–Thomistic 
position, which is so important even for John Paul II  in Veritatis Splendor, is connected 
with a teleological view of the universe: all natural beings – as Strauss put it – have a natural 
end, a natural destiny, which determines what kind of operation is good for them. In  the 
case of man, reason is required for discerning these operations. Reason determines what is 
by nature right, with ultimate regard to man’s natural end, and – we have to say – to man’s 
natural inclinations which direct him to this end (as we saw in Aquinas’s investigations). 
But this teleological view of the universe, of which the teleological view of man forms a part, 
has been destroyed for all practical purposes by modern natural science, also by liberals like 
Hobbes and Locke, whose mechanical conceptions situated every man only in relation to 
other individuals. From the point of view of Aristotle […] the issue between the mechanical 
and teleological conception of the universe is decided by the manner in which the problem of 
the heavens and the heavenly bodies and their motion is settled. Now in this respect, which 
from Aristotle’s own point of view was the decisive one, the issue seems to have been decided 
finally in favour of the mechanical conception of the universe. Here is the crucial point: the 
mechanical, or at any rate non-teleological conception of the universe, had to be accompanied 
by a  non-teleological conception of human life. This ‘naturalistic solution’ proves to be 
impossible. It is impossible to banish ends from the social sciences, or what amounts to the 
same thing, to conceive of ends as derivative from desires or impulses. Therefore the alternative 
has prevailed: which means that we have had to accept a typically modern dualism of a non-
teleological natural science and a teleological science of man. This is the position which the 
43 Ibid. n.  1954.
44 Ibid. n.  1956.
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modern followers of Thomas Aquinas, among others, are forced to take, a position which 
implies a  radical break with the thought of Aristotle, as well as that of Thomas Aquinas 
himself. The fundamental dilemma in whose grip we are, is the one caused by the success of 
modern natural science, a success which is presupposed rather than made doubtful by the 
so-called crisis in physics. An adequate solution to the problem of natural right cannot be 
found before this basic problem has been solved.46 But we should remember that Christian 
reflections are still connected with God; human dignity is universal because every man 
has God’s provenience; his dignity is grounded on his nature which has a source in God 
and thanks to His will every man – as His creation – is a human person like Him. Still, 
from this perspective, every human person acts rightly when he goes to the end connected 
with God, to salvation. Such a right act has a moral value and ought to be secured by legal 
norms. Here we still have a teleological position and moral dimension of acts. In modern 
conceptions, first of all in liberal ones, the teleological perspective is beyond rational 
knowledge. Rights which were grounded in the Thomistic view have no  foundation in 
rational, mechanical knowledge; or, in other words, natural rights are rejected first of all 
in the name of History, which (through anthropology) teaches us that no such right exists 
because instead of the supposed uniformity, we find an indefinite variety of notions of right 
or justice. But History is critical not only of the naturalistic essence of Thomistic rights, but 
also of the liberal, especially Lockean, set of universal rights. If we are still thinking of rights 
in terms of individual freedom or a sphere of privacy, if we are still thinking of rights as 
a negative area which is at the disposal of a specific individual only, we see them as to create 
subjective decisions by subjective conscience. Such conscience is not directed towards any 
supernatural end but only towards other individuals or a mechanically conceived society. 
When the existence of universal principles had to be denied, rights or law were radically 
separated from morality (the idea or the ideal of justice which sees natural rights directed 
to supernatural end) and substituted by natural rights of mechanical space.
In  the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the modern world “Gaudium et spes” of 
the Vatican Council II  (1965), we still have a  thesis that all political authority must be 
realised within the borders of the moral order47 and what is to be realised there is above 
all the inalienable right to life of every innocent human individual which is a constitutive 
element of a civil society and its legislation.48 This right is the human right and – at the 
same time – the right of every human person which is the foundation of human dignity 
and all other human rights. But all human persons as well as all human legislators ought 
to respect the moral order (connected – as we saw – with natural law) and make the right 
46 Strauss, Six lectures,  7–9.
47 Gaudium et spes, n.  74.
48 ‘The  inalienable rights of the person must be recognized and respected by civil society and the political 
authority. These human rights depend neither on single individuals nor on parents; nor do they represent 
a concession made by society and the state; they belong to human nature and are inherent in the person by 
virtue of the creative act from which the person took his origin. Among such fundamental rights one should 
mention in this regard every human being’s right to life and physical integrity from the moment of conception 
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of life of every (innocent) human individual compatible with it. For all human beings, 
interpersonal relationships are vital but for Christians they are constitutive, especially 
for the Christian vision of the human person as a being in relationship with God, with 
himself, with others and with nature: ‘Being a person in the image and likeness of God 
[…] involves existing in a  relationship, in relation to the other ‘I’ because God himself, 
one and triune, is the communion of the Father, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit’, as we 
are reading in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church,49 and everything is 
related, everything is connected, as we are reading several times in Pope Francis’s Encyclical 
Laudato Si’. The  fact that every human person is a  being in relationship not only with 
God and with himself, but also with others and with nature – which is also crucial for 
him and for these relationships – directs him towards his supernatural end and creates 
the fundamental moral context also for his legislation. As stated by the Vatican Council 
II, the correctness, justness and even legitimacy of the evanescent or temporal legal order 
depends on the realisation of the moral order50 and – as Pope John Paul II declared – the 
social organisation exists for supporting the rights of humans.51 From this perspective, the 
social organisation and its legal order exists not only for creating interpersonal peace but 
also for securing the fundamental rights of humans which are realised inside the natural 
law borders, being borders of the moral order prior to human will. As a consequence, the 
Catholic Church still presents this perspective on the rights of humans and natural law; 
still respects universal human inclinations as a foundation of natural law and – at the same 
time – human rights. Neither situationism, nor consequentialism and pure pragmatism 
could justify any attempt to negate the rules of natural law and – through it – the right of 
the human person. The Church now and again needs to show this position and the crucial 
point of the true foundation of the liberal-democratic societies also in in  21st century; as 
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde said in  2010: To conceive of such a state the liberal order needs 
a unifying ethos, a “sense of community” among those who live in this state. The question 
then becomes: what is creating this ethos, which can neither be enforced by the state nor 
compelled by a sovereign? One can say: first the common culture. But what are the elements 
and factors of that culture? Then indeed we are dealing with its sources such as Christianity, 
Enlightenment and humanism. But not automatically any religion.52
49 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, n.  34.
50 Gaudium et spes, n.  41,  59,  36.  ‘The  citizen is obliged in conscience not to follow the directives of civil 
authorities when they are contrary to the demands of the moral order, to the fundamental rights of persons or 
the teachings of the Gospel. Refusing obedience to civil authorities, when their demands are contrary to those 
of an upright conscience, finds its justification in the distinction between serving God and serving the political 
community. “Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.” 
“We must obey God rather than men”’ (Catechism of the Catholic Church, n.  2242).
51 John Paul II, ‘Speech on Philippines’, L’Osservatore Romano (Polish ed.) no 3 (1981).
52 “Freiheit ist ansteckend” Archived  2010.11.04 at the Wayback Machine, Frankfurter Rundschau,  1. November 
 2010  online,  2.  November  2010, S.  32f. See also a  very interesting discussion on this problem in German 
(positions e.g. Helmut Klages, Ronald Inglehart, Gerhard Himmelman, Jürgen Habermas, Elisabeth Noelle-
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As we read in the Declaration on Religious Freedom “Dignitatis Humanae” on the right 
of the person and of communities to social and civil freedom in matters religious (1965): 
A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself more and more deeply 
on the consciousness of contemporary man, and the demand is increasingly made that men 
should act on their own judgment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not 
driven by coercion but motivated by a  sense of duty. The  demand is likewise made that 
constitutional limits should be set to the powers of government, in order that there may be 
no encroachment on the rightful freedom of the person and of associations. This demand for 
freedom in human society chiefly regards the quest for the values proper to the human spirit. 
It regards, in the first place, the free exercise of religion in society. This Vatican Council takes 
careful note of these desires in the minds of men. It proposes to declare them to be greatly in 
accord with truth and justice (n.  1). The Second Vatican Council and the latest popes still 
emphasised some inviolable rights of humans to life and to religious freedom as a ground 
for the constitutional order of society which has a foundation in the very dignity of humans; 
dignity which is known also by reason itself and not only by the revelation of God.53
It is state institutions which have been made responsible for keeping this ‘new deal’. 
Churches are allowed to teach and thanks to the freedom of religion individuals are allowed 
to follow the teachings in their lives but, as the state is supposed to be neutral, no Church 
teachings (no matter if based on revelation or reason) can any longer be given legal value. 
Although the Catholic Church keeps insisting on its exceptional teaching authority which 
should guide both citizens and rulers, it has now been recognised as merely one of multiple 
intermediate structures which shall be confined to the private, non-political sphere.
53 But a critical point for non-Catholics is rooted in a moral obligation to seek the truth by every man, who has the 
duty, and therefore the right, to seek the truth in matters religious in order that he may with prudence form for 
himself right and true judgments of conscience, under use of all suitable means (Dignitatis humanae, nos  2 and  3). 
We must remember that another crucial problem is connected with the theories of rights. As Raymond Plant 
wrote: It might be thought paradoxical to argue that theories of rights could help to fill the legitimation deficit 
of liberal societies, since a theory of rights surely has to have some kind of moral foundation, and yet precisely 
the problem with liberalism, according to its critics, is that we cannot have a cognitive moral theory (morality 
is seen as a  matter of subjective preference) and we do not have a  non-instrumental view of reason (reason 
cannot establish moral truths). Yet, frequently, theories of rights have been introduced as attempts to provide 
a basic moral framework to regulate the relationships between members of liberal societies who differ profoundly 
about morality. This strategy involves ‘putting the right before the good’, in Rawls’ felicitous phrase. We disagree 
about the good, and we cannot accept that an authoritative view of the good can be established. Nevertheless, 
it is argued, it may be possible to reason about the right, that is to say about the framework of rights, which is 
appropriate and legitimate to regulate the relationships of those who differ fundamentally about the good. This, for 
example, is the position taken by the American philosopher Alan Gewirth, and is certainly one of the most subtle 
justifications of rights that recognises the fact of moral diversity and pluralism. At the same time, the whole rights-
based strategy has been criticised by Alasdair MacIntyre, who […] is a major inspiration to narrative theology 
and very important for contemporary Catholics (Raymond Plant, Politics, Theology and History [Cambridge: 
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